More Augustine on privation

From Against the Epistle of Manichaeus

For who can doubt that the whole of that which is called evil is nothing else than
corruption? Different evils may, indeed, be called by different names; but that which
is the evil of all things in which any evil is perceptible is corruption. So the corruption
of the educated mind is ignorance: the corruption of the prudent mind is imprudence;
the corruption of the just mind, injustice; the corruption of the brave mind, cowardice;
the corruption of a calm, peaceful mind, cupidity, fear, sorrow, pride. Again, in a
living body the corruption of health is pain and disease; the corruption of strength is
exhaustion; the corruption of rest is toil. Again, in any corporeal thing, the corruption
of beauty is ugliness; the corruption of straightness is crookedness; the corruption of
order is confusion; the corruption of entireness is disseverance, or fracture, or
diminution. . . . Enough has been said to show that corruption does harm only by
displacing the natural condition; and so, corruption is not nature, but against nature.
And if corruption is the only evil to be found anywhere, and if corruption is not
nature, no nature is evil.

On the Nature of Good

“Nature therefore which has been corrupted, is called evil, for assuredly when incorrupt it is good; but even when corrupt, so far as it is nature it is good, so far as it is corrupted it is evil.” 4

Hick on suffering

John Hick on suffering

by suffering we mean that state of mind in which we wish violent or obsessively that our situation were otherwise. such a state of mind involves memory and anticipation, the capacity to imagine alternatives, and (in man) a moral conscience. For the characteristic elements of human suffering are such relatively complex and high-level modes of consciousness as regret and remorse; anxiety and despair; guilt, shame, and embarrassment; the loss of someone loved, the sense of rejection, of frustrated wishes, and of failure. These all differ from physical pain in that they refer beyond the present moment. To be miserable is to be aware of a larger context of existence than one's immediate physical sensations, and to be overcome by the anguished wish that this wider situation were other than it is. [Evil and the God of Love, pp.354-5]

Two questions:
(1) Is this a privation account of suffering's badness in any traditional sense?

(2) He certainly means that suffering is (usually?) worse than physical pain alone. But how broad a time span does he have in mind? That is, it's plausible that over a week long period, suffering --as distinct from physical pain-- might be intrinsically worse. But could he plausibly say this about a stubbed toe 2 seconds after impact?

Why pains can't be privations

I've looked all over for someone making the most obvious and powerful objection to privation theories. Thank you Stanley Kane:

The difficulty is that pain seems clearly to be more than merely the absence of its contrary opposite. There is a marked difference between a limb which merely lacks feeling is numb or paralyzed or anesthetized and one that is racked with pain. In the former case it is quite plausible to say that is merely a privation of something, namely normal feeling, that under usual circumstances would belong to the limb. But it is clearly inadequate to describe a limb aching with pain as suffering merely a privation of good health or normal feeling. When pain occurs in the body, there is something new and different in a person’s experience which is not present when the body has simply lost feeling.

G.Stanley Kane, "Evil and Privation" Int J Phil Rel 11 (1980) 43-58

In which Adam experiences a privation of sanity

In an amazing display of how a mistaken theodicy can lead to idiocy, Anglin and Goetz write:

one must distinguish between pain as an evil (a privation of normal consciousness, an inability to enjoy the weather) and pain as an experienced quality (a strong stimulus, an overwhelming sensation). A pain is only an evil insofar as it is privative.

Sounds a bit weird. But let's hear some more...

The privationist must agree that the experienced quality of a pain is not a mere absence of something but this does not commit him to saying that it is a good. Instead he can maintain that it is neither good nor evil but a sort of neutral thing. Of course, the experienced quality of pain always entails a privation of our normal state of consciousness and it often signals a privation of our normal state of bodily well-being. It can result in fear or resentment which are tied up with yet other privations.

Wait for it...........

However, just insofar as it is an experienced quality, pain is not an evil. Indeed, in some cases, the absence of this experienced quality would be an evil. If you cut your finger it would be worse if you did not than if you did feel pain.

OWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW! IT BURNS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Someone please douse me with the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value to put the fire in my brain out........

OWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


*Anglin and Goetz, "Evil is Privation" Int J Phil Rel 13: 3-12 (1982), p.5

Augustine on privation

From the Enchiridion:

For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? in the bodies of animals, diseases and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present --namely, the diseases and wounds-- go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshy substance --the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils --that is, privations of the good which we call health-- are accidents. Just in the same way, what are called vices are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.

Enchiridion XI

Homework assignment: Pains seem to be evil in and of themselves. Yet pains are real and definite things. How can Augustine account for the badness of pain? Is Augustine committed to the view that insofar as they are real, pains are themselves good? If pains were to be bad as privations, what would they be privations of? Discuss.